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Abstract Grice (1975) pointed out that the ignorance inferences normally
drawn when disjunctive sentences are uttered are cancelled when it is presup-
posed that speakers are not going to provide all of the relevant information
that they have available (e.g., in the context of a treasure hunt). This argues
that ignorance inferences depend on the maxim of quantity for their deriva-
tion. Here it is argued that the situation with Scalar Implicatures is different.
This is expected by the grammatical theory of Scalar Implicatures, but not by
standard Gricean or neo-Gricean alternatives.
Keywords: Implicatures, Scalar Implicatures, ignorance inferences, Maxim of Quan-
tity, Exhaustification, Exh
The computation of Scalar Implicatures (SIs) is central to the division of
labor between specialized (domain specific) linguistic knowledge and general
properties of human reasoning. Traditional theories assume that SIs are
computed by a non-specialized cognitive system based on general principles
of rational behavior (Grice 1975, Horn 1972, 2004, van Rooij & Schulz 2006,
Sauerland 2004a,b, Spector 2006, inter alia, henceforth the pragmatic ap-
proach) while recent competitors assume that they are computed within a
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dedicated cognitive system — namely grammar (Chierchia 2004, 2006, Chier-
chia, Fox & Spector 2011, Fox 2007a, Fox & Hackl 2006, Landman 1998, Sevi
2005, inter alia, henceforth the grammatical approach).1
To illustrate the two positions, consider (1) and its SI: the inference that
John didn’t talk to both Mary and Sue.
(1) John talked to Mary or Sue.
According to the pragmatic approach, the SI follows from a consideration of
the motivations that could have led a rational speaker to utter (1) instead of
the alternative John talked to Mary and Sue. According to the grammatical
approach, such considerations do not lead to this inference, and grammatical
mechanisms need to be postulated to derive it.
It is my understanding that all participants in the debate believe that
both pragmatic and grammatical considerations are important in under-
standing the inferences that humans draw in communicative interactions.
Furthermore, I think that virtually everyone takes cooperative principles of
the sort postulated by Grice to be central to certain pragmatic considerations.
Likewise, I think everyone assumes that grammatical representations exist
and that they yield certain inferences from “literal meanings” (literal/logical
inferences). The debate, the way I understand it, pertains to the division of
labor between pragmatic considerations and grammatical mechanisms. More
specifically, it pertains to two issues: (a) to the nature of grammatical mecha-
nisms and the type of logical inferences that they can derive (in particular, to
whether or not they can derive SIs as logical inferences) and (b) to the correct
formulation of the cooperative principles and whether they can derive SIs as
pragmatic inferences
The goal of this squib is to present a rather simple challenge for the idea
that the cooperative principles derive SIs. The challenge will be based on
pragmatic contexts in which the relevant cooperative principle, namely the
Maxim of Quantity (MQ), is not operative, at least not in any straightforward
way. We will see that in such contexts, speakers may continue to draw SIs
(in particular, that they may continue to draw the exclusive inference we saw
in (1)). By contrast, inferences that under both approaches are based on MQ
disappear. This state of affairs is, as we will see, expected by the grammatical
approach but not by the pragmatic one.2
1 There is a third possibility, namely that SIs are computed by a dedicated cognitive system
distinct from grammar (Gazdar 1979, Singh 2012).
2 As pointed out to me by David Beaver, recent work by Asher (2012) and Asher & Lascarides
(2013) makes a similar argument. In particular, they identify situations in which goals of
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1 The conceptual landscape
Before we get there, I would like to reiterate a claim I made in earlier work
(Fox 2007a), which is directly relevant to the thought experiment we will be
considering, namely the claim that conceptual considerations do not easily
distinguish the two approaches. Here I disagree with various researchers who
have claimed that the pragmatic approach is conceptually superior in that it
does not require the mechanisms needed under the grammatical approach
(Geurts 2011, Sauerland 2012). I have responded to this argument by claiming
that the grammatical approach has a conceptual advantage elsewhere, namely
that it allows us to keep to a simpler view of pragmatics.
Specifically, imagine that MQ receives what I think is the simplest possible
formulation, namely that it requires a speaker to convey all the relevant in-
formation that she has available. If we assume that speakers obey the maxim
under this simple formulation, an utterance of a sentence S would always
convey ignorance with respect to bits of relevant information that are not
entailed by the literal meaning of S. In other words, for any S′, if S′ is relevant
and the speaker has a belief pertaining to its truth-value, the maxim requires
the speaker to share that belief. If the speaker’s utterance (the sentence S)
does not determine the truth-value of S′, it follows that the speaker is not
opinionated about the matter.3 In order for such an ignorance inference to
disappear, on the view advocated in Fox 2007a, the literal meaning of the
speaker and addressee are not sufficiently aligned to justify the claim that the situation
is cooperative. Furthermore, like me, they observe that SIs are still computed. It is my
impression, however, that there is an important distinction to be made between their
argument and the argument I will be making. Specifically, it seems to me that the situations
they describe (e.g., examination of defendant by prosecutor) still allow for a pragmatic
derivation of SIs, as they themselves claim. Specifically, it seems to me that in their situations
(as opposed to mine) there is a normative requirement that all relevant information be
provided by the speaker (despite the fact that goals and interests are not aligned). This
conceptual distinction explains what I think is an empirical distinction, namely, that in the
type of situations they describe ignorance inferences (the type of inferences that under the
two accounts I consider are based on MQ) are not eliminated, as evident by the prosecutor’s
felicitous response in (i), a variant of one of their examples, which targets the ignorance
inference:
(i) Prosecutor: Are there any bank accounts under your name in a Swiss bank?
Defendant: Either under my name or under my secretary’s.
Prosecutor: Do you seriously expect us to believe that you don’t know?
3 This, in essence, is the “symmetry problem” hinted at in Kroch 1972, and formulated in
various classes taught by Irene Heim and Kai von Fintel at MIT.
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sentence must be strengthened by grammatical mechanisms, i.e., by covert
exh (an operator which is optionally appended to any sentence).4
Under the pragmatic approach to SIs, strengthening happens in pragmat-
ics, which means that MQ needs to be tinkered with.5 So pragmatics is more
involved on the pragmatic approach, but syntax is simpler in that it does
not contain covert exh. This, in my view, is a conceptual impasse, one which
requires empirical arguments to distinguish the two approaches.6 The goal
of this squib is to focus on a distinction that follows directly from the debate
pertaining to the nature of MQ — in particular, to whether or not the maxim
can yield anything other than ignorance inferences.
4 Any theory of SIs must account for their optionality. Under the pragmatic theory this is
done by having key assumptions crucial for the computation of SIs (that the speaker is
opinionated, that alternatives are relevant, etc.) hold of some but not all contexts. In the
implementation of the grammatical theory I am presenting, the syntactic operator that yields
SIs is optional. See Magri 2011 for arguments in favor of a different approach to optionality
within the grammatical approach.
5 The end result of tinkering must be an overall weakening of the demands on speakers. If
SIs are to be derived in the pragmatic system, speakers cannot be demanded to provide all
relevant information. If that were a demand, a speaker that believed that the conjunctive
alternative of a disjunctive sentence is false would have to provide this information (contrary
to the assumption of the pragmatic approach). Two moves have been considered that
would yield the weakening required for a pragmatic approach. The common move involves
tinkering with the formulation of the maxim so that it only requires a speaker to provide bits
of information that can be formulated by formal alternatives of the chosen utterance (what I
have called the neo-Gricean Maxim of Quantity). Another move involves the assumption that
MQ can be violated at the service of other maxims which define the set of formal alternatives,
e.g., the maxim of manner (Katzir 2007). Note that both moves result in a more involved
pragmatic system than the one you get if MQ is evaluated independently of other maxims
and made no reference to alternatives (or rather if the space of potential alternatives is the
entire language).
6 Some of the recent literature attempts to locate areas where empirical consideration might
be found. Among those are the distribution of so called Embedded Implicatures (Chemla
2009b, Chemla & Spector 2011, Chierchia 2004, Cohen 1971, Crniˇc 2013, Horn 1989, Landman
1998, Levinson 2000, Zweig 2009, inter alia), the potential relevance of SIs for grammar and
in particular for polarity phenomena (Chierchia 2004, Gajewski 2011, Homer 2012, Chemla,
Homer & Rothschild 2011), Modularity (Fox & Hackl 2006, Magri 2009, 2011, Schlenker 2012),
Obligatory Implicatures (Chierchia 2004, 2006, Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2011, Crnicˇ 2013,
Ivlieva 2011, Magri 2009, 2011), generalizations that relate the distribution of SIs to that
of exhaustivity/maximality in grammar (Fox & Hackl 2006, Fox 2007b), the distribution of
free choice effects (Chemla 2009a, Fox 2007a, Franke 2011, Klinedinst 2007), and questions
pertaining to the connection between the alternatives for SIs and focus semantics (Fox &
Katzir 2011, Romoli 2012).
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2 Ignorance inferences vs. scalar implicatures
The distinction between the two approaches can be seen clearly when we
consider the set of inferences that are drawn in response to the utterance of
a disjunctive sentence (e.g., (1)). Besides inferences that follow from the basic
(inclusive-or) meaning, there are two inferences that need to be accounted
for, one is the exclusive-or inference, and the other is an ignorance inference,
the inference that the speaker’s beliefs do not determine which of the two
disjuncts is true.
(2) Inferences from an utterance of disjunctive sentence, M or S, by a
speaker x.
a. Exclusive inference (or SI): ¬(M & S)
(alternatively, Bx(¬(M & S))
b. Ignorance Inferences: ¬Bx(M), ¬Bx(¬M), ¬Bx(S), ¬Bx(¬S)
(in short, Ix(M), Ix(S))
According to the pragmatic approach, MQ is crucial for both types of in-
ference. The Ignorance Inferences follow directly from MQ7 whereas the
exclusive inference (the SI) follows from MQ in conjunction with the extra
assumption of an opinionated speaker (the auxiliary assumption that the
speaker is opinionated about the alternative conjunctive sentence).8
According to the grammatical approach as presented in section 1, the
exclusive inference (the SI) cannot possibly follow from MQ, which, as men-
tioned, is assumed to derive only ignorance inferences. To derive the exclu-
sive inference, it is assumed that the disjunctive sentence has exh(M or S) as
a grammatical parse which entails ¬(M & S). In other words, the disjunctive
sentence has two grammatical parses, one which lacks exh and leads to
ignorance about the conjunction (M & S) (to the extent that this conjunction
is assumed to be relevant) and one which contains exh and entails ¬(M & S).
Importantly, both parses lead to ignorance about the disjuncts, based on MQ
(and the assumption that each of the disjuncts is relevant).
7 Or rather from the assumption that it is common ground that x obeys MQ.
8 Specifically from the assumption that the speaker obeys MQ, interpreters conclude the
primary Implicatures ¬Bx(M) and ¬Bx(S), which together with Bx(M or S) (the consequence
of the maxim of quality), lead to Ix(M) and Ix(S) (Sauerland 2004b). The exclusive inference is
a strengthening of the primary Implicature ¬Bx(M & S) to the secondary Implicature Bx¬(M
& S) (a strengthening that follows once the extra-assumption of an opinionated speaker is
introduced, i.e., the assumption that Ix(M & S) is false).
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So now we can clearly see a distinct prediction. If we had a way to
deactivate MQ, the pragmatic approach would predict that this would lead
to the cancellation of both types of inferences whereas the grammatical
approach would only predict the elimination of Ignorance Inferences.9
3 Deactivating the Maxim of Quantity
With this in mind, consider the following TV game show,10 in which utterances
by the host are presupposed to disobey MQ. There are 100 boxes and five
of them contain a million dollars each (the rest of the boxes are empty).
The show’s host knows the identity of the five boxes, but will, of course,
not disclose this information. At any point, contestants can take the risk of
choosing a box. If a contestant points at a box with a million dollars, the
contestant leaves the game with the money. If a contestant points at an empty
box, the contestant leaves the game with nothing. At various points hints are
provided by the host, with the common understanding that these reveal only
part of the relevant information available to the host — in violation of MQ.
Imagine that at one of these points, the host utters the following sentence.
(3) There is money in box 20 or 25.11
Before we get to the differing predictions, it is important to understand
a good result that both approaches share — one that is dependent on the
assumption that MQ is deactivated. Both approaches can explain the fact
that the disjunction in (3) is appropriate despite the fact that the speaker
is assumed to be opinionated about each of the disjuncts. In a run-of-the-
mill context in which MQ is not deactivated, this would not be the case.
Imagine that the host uttered (3), not as a hint to the contestants, but as an
explanation to a colleague (say, an additional host) who, like her, is supposed
to know where the money is. This utterance would be quite odd and the
oddity would be explained, under both approaches, by the assumption that
9 Deactivating the maxim might affect the choice that interpreters would make between the
two available parses, but there is no logical necessity that the exclusive inference will be
absent.
10 An elaboration of an example due to Grice, see footnote 17.
11 Keenan (1974) claims that speakers of Malagasy tend to violate MQ systematically. If this
is correct, the logic employed here could be employed quite generally within the language:
the pragmatic theory would predict that no SI would be computed in the language whereas
the grammatical theory would not. Thanks to Luka Crnicˇ for bringing up this point. See
von Fintel & Matthewson 2008 and references therein.
5:6
Cancelling the Maxim of Quantity
in this alternative context MQ is active and the speaker is expected to provide
all relevant available information.
When it is common ground that the speaker is opinionated (i.e., not
ignorant) about the disjuncts, utterance of a disjunction is, in most contexts,
odd, and this follows, under both accounts, from MQ. Specifically, MQ leads
to the inference that the speaker is ignorant about the disjuncts, and this
ignorance inference clashes with what is common ground. The fact that no
oddity is attested when (3) is uttered as a hint in the game show context
is explained, under both accounts, based on the assumption that MQ is
deactivated and hence ignorance inferences are eliminated (footnote 17).
The differing predictions of the two approaches pertain to the status of
the SI, the exclusive inference that there isn’t money in both boxes. The prag-
matic approach predicts that this exclusive inference would be unavailable.
The reason for this is plain. For the SI to be generated, a maxim must be
presupposed that would require the speaker (that is the host) to utter the
conjunctive sentence if she thought it were true. But it is clear that no such
maxim is presupposed. In fact, the exact opposite is presupposed: it is quite
clear that if the host believed that the conjunctive sentence is true, she would
not utter it, since this would defeat the purpose of the game. Moreover,
we have to assume that no such maxim is presupposed, or else we would
not able to explain the fact that ignorance inferences are eliminated (and
subsequently a clash with common ground is avoided).
The prediction under the grammatical approach is different. Under the
grammatical approach, a parse with exh would lead to an SI whether or
not MQ is active. The grammatical theory, thus, predicts the exclusive
SI to be in principle available. Testing the differing prediction, however,
is not necessarily going to be simple, as MQ might be relevant under the
grammatical theory as well; specifically it might be relevant for the choice
between competing parses that are in principle available for the sentence
(only one of which leads to the exclusive inference, see footnote 4), and,
moreover, its absence might lead to a preference of a parse that does not
entail the SI.12
12 When MQ is active, it seems reasonable to expect that the pragmatic inferences that it
delivers (ignorance inferences) will be relevant for the choice among competing parses, and
in particular that it might prefer stronger meanings from opinionated speakers. So under
the standard assumption that (at least in run-of-the-mill situations) we tend to take speakers
to be opinionated, one pragmatic pull towards computing SIs is eliminated when MQ is not
active (Fox 2007a). (If we know that a speaker is not ignorant about a particular piece of
information and parse 1 leads to an ignorance inference that contradicts this knowledge,
5:7
Danny Fox
So, if MQ is deactivated, the pragmatic theory predicts SIs to be categor-
ically unavailable whereas the grammatical theory predicts them to be in
principle available, though not necessarily preferred. To test this prediction,
I think it is a good idea to contrast (3) with (4).
(4) There is money in box 20 or 25 or both.
(4) is a sentence which is never associated with the exclusive SI. The explana-
tion for this categorical fact is not important in the present context, though
it has been argued elsewhere to favor the grammatical approach (Chierchia,
Fox & Spector 2011). What is important for my current purposes is that (4)
provides us with a minimal pair that can serve to test the differing predic-
tions that the two approaches make for (3). Under the pragmatic approach,
when MQ is deactivated, (3) and (4) should be indistinguishable. Under the
grammatical approach, this is not the case.
With this in mind, imagine that someone revealed the contents of the two
boxes right after the host’s utterance was made, and that each box turned
out to contain a million dollars. It seems clear to me that one could sensibly
accuse the host of providing a misleading hint in the case of (3) but that this
is simply impossible in the case of (4). In particular, it seems to me that the
response in (5a) is coherent but that in (5b) is not.13
(5) a. What you said was wrong. You said there was money in box 20 OR
box 25. But, in fact, there was money in both boxes.14
while a competing parse with exh (parse 2) does not, this should serve as good grounds for
preferring parse 2.)
13 Another relevant thought experiment involves a scenario in which an utterance of either (3)
or (4) is followed by a successful move by one of the contestants. Imagine, for example, that
the relevant contestant guesses that box 20 has money in it, that the guess turns out to be
right and that the contestant leaves the show with a million dollars. The next question is
how likely the remaining contestants would be to choose box 25. It seems to me that there is
a difference between (3) or (4). More specifically, that the likelihood of choosing box 25 is
greater in the case of (4) than in the case of (3). If this is correct, it would follow from the
grammatical approach under the assumption that (3) can be associated with an SI even when
MQ is deactivated. This type of explanation is unavailable under the pragmatic approach.
Whether an alternative explanation can be given remains to be seen.
14 The second sentence in (5a) involves negation of the strengthened meaning of a sen-
tence — under the grammatical theory, an embedded implicature. Under the pragmatic
approach, the sentence asserts via “meta-linguistic negation” that an utterance of the dis-
junction would be inappropriate because it would lead to an incorrect implicature (Horn
1989). The point here is that there is no obvious way for the incorrect Implicature to be
derived given that MQ is not active. Note the special pitch accent on the scalar item in (5a)
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b. #What you said was wrong. You said there was money in box 20 OR
box 25 OR both. But, in fact, there was money in both boxes.
This contrast can be accounted for by the grammatical approach to SIs
but not (at least not in any immediate way) by the pragmatic approach.
Under the grammatical approach, the SI of (3) follows from a parse of the
sentence that contains exh, a parse that is in principle available in this
communicative context.15 One could, thus, accuse the host of providing
misleading information when money is in both boxes, because the host could
anticipate such a parse as a possibility. For (4), a parse with exh is available
as well, but it does not lead to the exclusive inference for reason discussed
(and motivated extensively) in Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2011.
Under the pragmatic approach, by contrast, there is no way for the
exclusive inference of (3) to follow as an SI since MQ has been deactivated.
The straightforward conclusion is that the SI available in (3) (and not in (4))
does not depend on MQ. But one could try to develop an alternative pragmatic
explanation of the contrast.16 I will return to one such attempt in section 7.
Before we get there, however, I would like to provide further evidence that
MQ is indeed deactivated in our game show scenario.
4 Further evidence that MQ is deactivated
In the context of the game show, ignorance inferences disappear. This
fact can be taken as evidence that in this context MQ is deactivated (since
both theories we’re considering rely on MQ to derive ignorance inferences).
With this in hand, we can take the fact that SIs persist as evidence for the
grammatical theory. But one might suggest that ignorance inferences are
eliminated not due to a deactivation of MQ but because their derivation would
contradict what we’ve been told at the outset (namely that the host knows
where the money is).
has been identified by Horn as a necessary requirement for this particular use of negation
(see Fox & Spector 2009 for a different perspective).
15 Though, again, one could provide reasons why it would be dispreferred (relative to cases
where MQ is active) — see footnote 12.
16 One might suggest, for example, that it follows from considerations pertaining to the
inferences that the sentences would have had they been uttered in a different context, one in
which MQ is operative. The challenge for this suggestion would be to explain why ignorance
inferences do not follow in the same way. Alternatively, one might try to derive the contrast
from more specific assumptions about the type of strategies that contestants employ in
game shows. I will elaborate on the first possibility in section 5.
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This is not a trivial suggestion for reasons discussed earlier. After all, in
other cases where ignorance inferences predicted by MQ conflict with what
we’re told at the outset, there is a sensation of oddity that results from this
conflict. But in this particular case, no such sensation arises. Still one might
try to come up with a sophisticated story about conflict resolution that would
distinguish the two cases.
To provide further evidence that MQ is indeed deactivated, I would like
to show that the situation doesn’t change when ignorance inferences are
consistent with background assumptions. I think that this can be done by
a simple modification of our thought experiment. Assume, for example,
that the host does not know the identity of the boxes with the money, but
that at various stages she is given some information (which could be quite
partial) and then decides what hints to provide to the players. In other words,
assume that the common ground does not determine whether or not the host
is ignorant about relevant information: it does not rule out the possibility
that the host is ignorant but at the same time does not determine that she is.
Other than that, keep things as they were, namely continue to assume that
the host would never reveal the identity of a box that contains money, even
if she knew it (since that would defeat the purpose of the game).
The important observation is that the contrast between (3) and (4) persists
(as can be seen perhaps more clearly by looking at (5)), and neither utterance
is associated with ignorance inferences: in neither case would we conclude
that the host does not know of one of the boxes that it contains the money.
The reason for the lack of ignorance inferences seems clear: we do not derive
an ignorance inference because we are not assuming that the host is following
MQ. This observation is not the one problematic for the pragmatic approach.
But it does serve to illustrate that we are indeed able to suspend MQ, and
that when we do so, the consequences of MQ for pragmatic reasoning should
be factored out. With this in place, the challenge for the pragmatic approach
is to explain why suspension of MQ (which makes the correct prediction
for ignorance inferences) makes the wrong prediction for SIs (i.e., does not
eliminate the contrast between (3) and (4)).17
17 In fact the point about the suspension of ignorance inferences is made by Grice himself
(1989, pp. 44–55) in connection with an argument against theories that would introduce
ignorance into the semantics. His example The prize is either in the garden or in the attic
does not allow us to see whether the SI is retained, since the prize cannot possibly be in
both locations (independently of whether or not disjunction is read exclusively). Thanks to
Uli Sauerland for referring me to this discussion.
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What we’ve seen, in short, is that there are good reasons to believe
that we’ve been able to deactivate MQ. If this is correct, we learned that
deactivation of MQ leads to cancellation of ignorance inferences, but not SIs.
This state of affairs coincides with the assumptions made in the grammatical
approach about division of labor, namely that only ignorance inferences
depend on MQ. Furthermore, the situation (the dissociation between SIs
and ignorance inferences) appears to conflict directly with the assumption
about division of labor made in the pragmatic approach, where both types of
inference rely on MQ.
5 Other scalar items
Disjunctive sentences are normally associated with both ignorance inferences
and SIs. This dual property allowed us to test for SIs while using the absence
of ignorance inferences to ensure that MQ is deactivated. But we should ask
whether the same results are attested with other SIs (SIs that are triggered
by scalar items other than disjunction). While we cannot use ignorance
inferences to ensure that MQ is deactivated, it seems to me that the facts
remain the same. Specifically, the contrast in (5) can be replicated with other
SIs, as exemplified below for some.
(6) a. Host: Some of the red boxes have money in them.
b. Contestant, upon seeing what’s in the boxes, contests:
What you said was wrong. You said that there was money in SOME
of the red boxes but in fact there was money in ALL of them.
(7) a. Host: Some or all of the red boxes have money in them.
b. Contestant, upon seeing what’s in the boxes, contests:
#What you said was wrong. You said that there was money in SOME
or all of the red boxes but in fact there was money in ALL of them.
6 Further prediction
Consider the following dialogue in the context of the game show (more
specifically under the version of the game show described in section 4,
where it is not presupposed that the speaker always has all of the relevant
information).
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(8) a. Host: There is money in box 20 or 25.
b. Contestant, upon learning new facts about the host (say after the
game is over when analyzing a video recording that revealed what
the host knew at every instance):
#You haven’t been completely honest. We now see that you knew
more than you had told us: in particular that you knew that there
was money in box 20 and not in box 25.
The contestant’s response seems inappropriate given the context. This is
not surprising under either of the approaches to SIs we are considering. In
the context of the game show, MQ is deactivated, and there is no reason
to expect the host to tell the contestant everything she knows (even if it is
pertinent). Hence, it is inappropriate for the contestant to object to the host’s
under-informative statement.
Compare this with the dialogue in (9), which differs in that the disjunctive
sentence is embedded under a universal epistemic operator.
(9) a. Host: I have been able to ascertain (from some of the hints that
have been provided to me by my colleague over there who knows
where the money is) that there is either money in box 20 or 25.
b. Contestant, upon learning new facts about the host (say after the
game is over when analyzing a video recording that revealed what
the host knew at every instance):
You haven’t been completely honest. We now see that you were able
to ascertain more than you had told us: in particular that you were
able to ascertain that there was money in box 20 and not in box 25.
The grammatical approach predicts a contrast between (8) and (9).18 The
host’s utterance in (8) cannot be associated with an SI pertaining to her
epistemic state, but the host’s utterance in (9) can be. Specifically a sentence
18 Thanks to an S&P reviewer for pointing out this prediction. The reviewer tested the prediction
with the modal must, where it does not appear to be verified. It is my hope that the case
I’m presenting (along with judgments of my informants) is the indicative one, but the topic
clearly deserves further investigation. An obvious question that arises (if my suspicion about
the facts is correct), is what other factor can be relevant in determining the felicity of the
examples besides the formal availability of exhaustification. My speculation is that in the
context of the game show, one normally assumes that the host knows where the money is,
and hence required (for the maxim of quality to be satisfied) to provide the non-exhaustified
parse. My speculation is that (for some reason that I don’t understand) the attitude verb in
(9) differs from must in countering this tendency.
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of the form I am able to ascertain that p or q can be associated with the SI
that the speaker is not able to ascertain that p (likewise for q). (See Chierchia,
Fox & Spector 2011, Fox & Hackl 2006, Fox 2007b, Sauerland 2004a,b, Spector
2006.) Such a contrast is not predicted by the pragmatic approach. If the
contrast is real (as I feel and as reported by my three informants), it argues
that the earlier contrast between ignorance inferences and SIs is not directly
related to the epistemic nature of the former, but rather to the fact that they
are derived by different mechanisms. After all, the SI in (9) has exactly the
same epistemic status as the ignorance inferences in (8).19
7 A possible Gricean response
One way to defend the pragmatic theory is to claim that, despite initial
appearances, we haven’t been entirely successful in suspending MQ. The
challenge, of course, will be to distinguish SIs from ignorance inferences.
In what follows I will present an attempt at doing so based on proposals
made to me by Philippe Schlenker and Sasha Podobryaev. Imagine that
MQ is never suspended in its entirety. When the actual speaker (AS) is
patently disobeying MQ, participants in the conversation nevertheless pretend
that MQ is obeyed.20 This pretense requires participants to imagine certain
(counterfactual) modification of the actual context that would be consistent
with the assumption that MQ is obeyed. Neo-Gricean reasoning proceeds
under counterfactual assumptions and the conclusion of this reasoning are
then translated to the actual context if appropriate (e.g., if the translation
follows from assumptions about the nature of the relationship between the
factual and counterfactual situation).
19 I should note, however, that my informants find (9) degraded relative to (6) and (5a), and
that this contrast is not expected by anything we’ve said. A possible way to account for
what seems like a three way distinction is to assume that the parse that would make (9)
acceptable is possible (in contrast to (8) and (5b)) but dispreferred (in contrast to (6) and
(5a)). Specifically, I’d like to note that under the necessary parse for (9), the host’s utterance
conveys information about the hosts epistemic state that is probably not relevant given the
issues that the contestants are trying to resolve. Specifically, the contestants need to figure
out whether it is a good idea to take a risk and gamble on a particular box. Knowing whether
the host has information beyond what she conveyed is not relevant, and a reasonable parsing
strategy will yield a parse that conveys only relevant information.
20 Similar pretense was assumed by Stalnaker (1999: 51) in his discussion of conversations that
appear to involve no exchange of new information (e.g., at the barber’s). His claim was that
in such conversation “we are pretending to communicate and our pretense can be explained
in terms of the same categories as a serious exchange of information.”
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So, in our particular setup, AS is barred from providing certain pieces
of relevant information, even when they are available to her (so as to keep
the game going). In the previous sections, I have assumed that the hearer
takes this bit of contextual information into account and simply reasons
about the belief state of AS with the standard premise that she is obeying
MQ replaced with its negation. What we can assume, instead, is that the
hearer reasons about the belief state of someone else — an imaginary speaker
(IS) — one who, in contrast to AS, does obey MQ. AS and the hearer agree to
pretend (implicitly of course) that IS is the actual speaker, and to see what
consequences follow about the mental state of IS. They then ask themselves
whether any of these conclusions can have ramifications for the mental state
of AS, under reasonable assumptions about the relationship between IS and
AS. In other words, they ask themselves whether there is a way to transfer
the inferences about the mental state of IS to conclusions about the mental
state of AS.
To understand the nature of the challenge, let’s repeat our empirical
conclusions from the previous section. In the game setup we’ve constructed
the ignorance inferences normally associated with a disjunction were not
attributed to the host, AS. We’ve taken this fact as evidence that MQ was
deactivated. The fact that SIs could still be computed (in the absence of
ignorance inferences) we took as evidence that SIs can persist even when MQ
is deactivated. But let’s now assume that MQ is not deactivated for IS and
that SIs are computed along neo-Gricean lines.
AS and hearer consider an utterance of the disjunction in (3). This leads
to various inferences about IS: to an ignorance inference with respect to both
disjuncts and (under the assumption of an opinionated speaker) to the SI
that IS believes the negation of the conjunction. Let’s see this in detail:
(10) Utterance by AS:
There is money in box 20 or 25: (20∨ 25)
Basic Inferences about IS:
a. IS obeys Quality: BIS(20∨ 25)
b. IS obeys MQ: ¬BIS(20), ¬BIS(25), ¬BIS(20∧ 25).
(a) + (b): IIS(20), IIS(25),
c. (b) + Opinionated Speaker: BIS¬(20∧ 25)
Step (10a) is the most basic inference, one that follows from the assumption
that IS believes what she uttered (Quality). Step (10b) is the inference from the
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assumption that IS uttered the strongest utterance she believes among the
formal alternatives (MQ in its neo-Gricean formulation). By simple deduction
from (10a) and (10b), we derive the ignorance inferences: If IS believes a
disjunction and does not believe any of the disjuncts, it follows that IS’s
beliefs are compatible with the truth and with the falsity of each disjunct (i.e.,
that IS is ignorant about each disjunct). Step (10c) follows from step (10b)
if we have reasons to add the extra assumption that IS is opinionated about
the conjunction, an assumption consistent with the more basic inferences
in (10a) and (10b). The challenge is now to come up with a story about the
relationship between IS and AS that would lead to the cancellation of the
inferences about the disjuncts in step (10b) but not of the parallel inference
about the conjunction or of its strengthening in step (10c) by an extra auxiliary
assumption.
What was suggested to me is that AS is assumed to share every belief
that IS has, but that she might be more opinionated than AS. This sounds
reasonable. After all, the cases in which AS would be assumed to disobey MQ
are precisely those in which too much information is available to AS (where
conveying the information AS has available would destroy the game). So if
we were to modify our assumptions about the speaker, so that MQ would be
obeyed, it seems reasonable to suppose that we would make the speaker less
opinionated than she actually is. From these assumptions, we conclude that
inferences about the beliefs of IS can be attributed to AS, but we can’t yet
conclude that inferences about the ignorance of IS can be attributed to AS.
I think this is a very interesting proposal but I also think that there are
at least three serious questions that it raises. The first question pertains
to the justification of the crucial premise (that AS shares every one of IS’s
beliefs). An obvious justification is to assume that AS’s belief state is as close
as possible to IS’s, modulo the assumption that there are bits of information
that AS cannot convey (given the design of the game). In other words, what
we’re doing here is considering a modification of reality under which the
speaker is cooperative. This type of counterfactual reasoning, one would
think, should involve the minimal modification that would allow the desired
assumption to hold (that the speaker is cooperative). But if this is the case, it
seems to me that we would have reason to conclude that inferences about
the ignorance of IS can be attributed to AS as well, at least whenever this is
consistent with contextual assumptions. But, as I’ve argued in section 4, that
doesn’t seem to be the case.
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The second question arises if the prediction stated in section 6 is correct,
namely if it is correct that inferences identical in their content to ignorance
inferences can nevertheless be attributed to AS, when they can be computed
as SIs — (9). It is not clear to me how the proposal outlined above can
distinguish (8) from (9).
The third question pertains to step (10c). In a Gricean setup, one would
hope that the assumption of an opinionated speaker could be contextually
supported. It is often supposed that this is not the case, and that the
assumption needs to be hard-wired. But this would, of course, not be the
optimal state of affairs. My own feeling is that it could be avoided in many
cases. For example, when Mary says that she has three kids, it is reasonable to
assume that she knows how many kids she has, hence that she is opinionated
about the relevant alternatives. Likewise, when someone says that there are
four books on the table, it is reasonable to assume that she obtained this
information in some way, e.g., that she counted them. But there seem to
be no contextually supported assumptions about AS that can justify step
(10c) (aside perhaps from the assumption that AS is as close as possible to
IS, which leads to our first question). So, if the account sketched above is to
be adopted, there seems to be little hope for a neo-Gricean theory to derive
the auxiliary assumption of an opinionated speaker based on contextual
considerations. In other words, if the account sketched above is correct, the
assumption of an opinionated speaker would definitely need to be hard-wired
in a neo-Gricean setup.
So to sum up, I am not claiming that it is impossible to tell a story
about our observation within the pragmatic approach. My main point is that
the view of pragmatics presupposed by the grammatical approach makes
exactly the right prediction without any auxiliary assumptions. Specifically,
it predicts a clear distinction between ignorance inferences and SIs: the
cancellation of MQ should lead to the elimination of ignorance inferences but
not of SIs. The challenge for the pragmatic approach is to explain why things
have to be this way. At the moment it seems to me that there are certain
assumptions that one can make about pretense that might lead to the correct
results. But these assumptions involve various choices that seem somewhat
arbitrary on independent grounds. Whether there is a more natural way to
derive the results in a pragmatic theory is, of course, an open question.
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